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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The 1990s marked the start of extensive re-structuring in the aerospace industry 
throughout the world. While the ensuing consolidation among prime contractors has 
been widely researched, the changes affecting the aerospace supply chain have 
received less attention. This study focuses on the re-structuring taking place within 
the supply chain of the UK aerospace industry. The findings point to extensive re-
structuring. Unlike most earlier studies the lean supply model was found to be a 
powerful influence, with suppliers moving away from subcontractor status and instead 
taking on the mantle of ‘talented’ suppliers. While some of the implications of lean 
supply, in terms of the dynamics of innovation, were not apparent, there were modest 
signs of increased process innovation on the part of some suppliers.
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TALENTED SUPPLIERS? STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE UK AEROSPACE 
INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aerospace industry in the UK and elsewhere is in the throes of change. This is 
linked to greatly increased competitive pressures affecting firms across the industry. 
Where in the past competition was based around differentiation and technical features, 
over the last decade issues of cost and affordability have come to the fore. 
Significantly the increased competitiveness and emphasis on cost leadership has not 
been confined to the civil sector, the same pressures are now much in evidence in the 
defence sector. 
 
In the civil sector, commercial airlines have become more cost conscious in the face 
of the twin forces of de-regulation and privatization. The de-regulation that 
transformed the airline industry in the US in the 1980s (Sampson, 1984), has now 
spread across the world (Hanlon, 1999). The growth of ‘no frills’ airlines in the US 
and Europe (Dogannis, 2001) is only one sign of a much bigger change in the 
commercial environment.  The effect of de-regulation combined with the privatization 
of many state-owned airlines has been to heighten competition among the world’s 
airlines ending the ‘built-in incentives and premiums for innovation’ and instead 
substituting greater pressure for cost reductions (Gray, Golob and Markusen 1996: 
p657), not just in the short run but in the long run too. This in turn has impacted on 
the commercial sector of the aerospace industry making issues of cost and 
affordability much more important. 
 
The defence sector has faced the twin forces of reduced defence spending, following 
the ending of the Cold War (Bilstein, 2001, Moore et al. 2001) and tougher 
procurement regimes (Owen, 1999). Defence cuts led to reductions in orders for new 
aircraft and a greater willingness to extend the service life of existing aircraft. 
Procurement changes arose from concerns in both the US (Patillo, 1998) and the UK 
with cost over-runs. In the UK the biggest change was a move away from the cost 
plus environment of the 1960s and 1970s where defence contracts were awarded by 
the state on a non-competitive basis and priced according to actual cost plus a profit 
mark-up  (Bishop and Williams, 1997: p21), in favour of a regime of competitive 
tendering and fixed price contracts. These changes marked an end to what Bishop and 
Williams (1997: p21) describe as, ‘the cosy relationship between management, the 
military and the state’, where firms could maintain their position in the industry 
through producing highly specialised products. In its place came a much greater 
emphasis on costs. In this environment not only was outright cost important, so too 
was cost of ownership, and the profitability of defence suppliers was directly linked to 
the effective control of costs. 
 
Faced with increased emphasis on affordability and costs in both the civil and defence 
sectors, the  aerospace industry responded by re-structuring, that saw rationalization 
and shakeout (Heppenheimer, 1995), as firms merged or left the industry altogether 
(Hayward, 1994). Most evident in the US in the early 1990s, a similar pattern was 
much in evidence in Europe later in the decade (Moore et al., 2001). More recently 
the shock waves of change leading to a more competitive, price sensitive environment 
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have begun to ripple through the supply chain, as prime contractors have sought to 
improve their competitiveness by making the supply chain more efficient. 
 
It is these changes that form the focus of this study. It aims to identify the strategic 
changes currently taking place in the aerospace supply chain in the UK and to analyse 
the impact of these changes upon suppliers, especially the role of suppliers within the 
supply chain. In the process the study endeavours to assess the implications of 
suppliers’s new role for innovation within the UK aerospace industry. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The aerospace supply chain has received much less attention from researchers than its 
automotive counterpart. Nonetheless the small number of studies that have been 
undertaken in the US and Europe, indicate that the 1990s saw the start of a process of 
strategic change involving extensive re-structuring of the supply side of the industry, 
a process that is still underway. The studies fall into two broad categories. There are 
those that provide a broad overview of the current trends with few references to 
specific examples and there are the more specialized studies that examine the changes 
taking place in the aerospace supply chain through case studies of particular 
organizations, including both prime contractors and suppliers. 
 
Examples of studies that fall within the first category include Paliwoda and 
Bonaccorsi (1994) and Moore, Neal and Antill (2001). Paliwoda and Bonaccorsi’s 
study focuses on trends in procurement within the European aircraft sector. Given the 
focus, the study not unsurprisingly deals mainly with aspects of procurement. 
However it does identify a number of broad trends within the aerospace supply chain. 
These include prime contractors reducing the size of their supplier base and the 
introduction long term agreements with their suppliers. The trend towards prime 
contractors reducing their supplier base, through a process of supplier rationalization 
that means they purchase directly from fewer first tier suppliers,  was also picked up 
by Moore, Neal and Antill (2001). Another feature noted by both studies was the 
trend towards the involvement of suppliers in the early stages of new projects. 
Alongside these changes Paliwoda and Bonaccorsi (1994, p236) also noted a move 
towards ‘systems buying’ that is prime contractors purchasing complete systems or 
sub-systems as modules rather than purchasing individual components and 
undertaking assembly of the system themselves.  
 
While these studies suggest that aerospace is following the automotive industry in 
terms of the nature of the strategic changes taking place in the supply chain, they are 
short on specific examples of practice. Fortunately a small number of recent research 
studies, involving case studies of specific organizations, have begun to furnish more 
details. What makes these studies particularly useful is that the case studies are drawn 
from both sides of the supply chain and both sides of the Atlantic, involving prime 
contractors and suppliers, as well as US and European aerospace companies. 
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Bozdogan, Deyst, Hoult and Lucas (1998) in a study of two US prime contractors not 
only concur with the trends identified in the more broadly based studies, including the 
introduction of long term agreements, they also highlight changes in the nature of the 
relationship between prime contractors and their suppliers. They note a move away 
from conventional sub-contracting in favour of closer more collaborative relations, 
characterised by trust-based relationships that emphasize a team approach.  They also 
found evidence of suppliers enhancing the range of capabilities they have to offer 
their customers.. 
 
Frear and Metcalf (1995) undertook another US based study that also featured in-
depth case studies, this time of a single organisation, a supplier manufacturing 
complex aluminium and magnesium castings for aero engines. Within the supply 
chain the relationship between prime contractor and first tier supplier had recently 
changed. Frear and Metcalf (1995) found that the first tier supplier had taken over 
responsibility for a major engine subsystem or module, namely the engine gearbox. In 
turn the relationship between the gearbox supplier and the castings manufacturer had 
also changed. The relationship was now more collaborative with the castings 
manufacturer providing extensive technical support. What emerges is a picture of 
increased specialisation as the castings manufacturer extended its competence and 
capability within its chosen field. 
 
The three European studies were drawn from three different countries, Sweden 
(Brown, 2000), France (Talbot, 2000) and Italy (Giunta, 2000). The Swedish study 
involved a case study of Volvo Aero based in Trollhättan, a first tier supplier that 
makes commercial aero engine parts for the ‘Big Three’  commercial aero engine 
manufacturers General Electric, Pratt and Whitney and Rolls-Royce, as well 
manufacturing and servicing military engines. Although the study focussed 
principally on barriers to local sourcing, it provides a valuable perspective on 
developments in the aerospace supply chain. As the scale of its commercial aero 
engine work has grown so the company’s role has changed (Brown, 2000, p298). It is 
increasingly focusing on its core business. As a result Volvo Aero is becoming less 
vertically integrated, outsourcing ancillary services, including metal fabrication, to 
small local suppliers.  However as Brown (2000, p299) shows this has been 
associated with extensive supplier development work on the part of Volvo Aero, 
including the provision of training, technical assistance and the sale of specialized 
capital equipment, in order to help upgrade the all-round capability of its suppliers.  
 
In contrast Talbot’s (2000) study focuses not on a supplier, but on a prime contractor, 
the French aerospace manufacturer Aerospatiale. The study looks at the changes that 
have occurred in Aerospatiale’s subcontracting relationships particularly in terms of 
its suppliers in the Midi-Pyrenees region around Toulouse in the South West of 
France. Like the earlier studies it notes that during the 1990s, Aerospatiale, as a prime 
contractor rationalized its supplier base, with important consequences for the 
surrounding region (Talbot, 2000, p213). Although Talbot (2000) suggests that one of 
the primary reasons for this was a decline in state support for Aerospatiale, he notes 
that it was also accompanied by changes in the company’s relationship with its 
suppliers. In particular the development of closer relations with suppliers involving 
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monthly programme reviews and the use of electronic communication for scheduling 
orders and deliveries. 
 
Finally Giunta (2000) explored the changes taking place during the 1990s in the 
Italian aerospace industry, focusing on the first tier supplier, Alenia, and its associated 
network of suppliers based in the Campania region of Southern Italy. Alenia 
manufactures aerostructures, which take the form of major airframe sub-assemblies 
including fuselage sections, vertical stabilizers and flaps. Alenia is a direct supplier to 
the main commercial airliner producers Boeing and Airbus. Giunta (2000) found that 
as far as Alenia was concerned, while there had been extensive restructuring of the 
supply chain in the more difficult trading environment of the 1990s, extending to 
continued vertical disintegration and rationalization of the supplier base in Southern 
Italy, there was only limited evidence of systems buying or collaborative 
relationships.  
 
These studies show that the aerospace industry has been subjected to extensive re-
structuring during the 1990s. In particular there have been majors changes taking 
place as far as the supply chain is concerned. The case study based research in 
particular highlights the fact the change has not been confined to one part of the 
supply chain, for instance the prime contractors. Rather strategic changes have been 
affected suppliers at all levels. The three European studies also highlight that the 
changes have not been confined to one side of the Atlantic. Despite the lack of a 
major study based on the UK aerospace industry, it is clear that strategic change and 
restructuring have occured in Europe as well as the US.  
 
What has been behind the changes? Nearly all the studies point to the less favourable 
environment for aerospace that resulted from the ending of the Cold War combined 
with the global recession of the early 1990s. This fits with the picture outlined at the 
start of the paper. What is perhaps more surprising is that only one study, that by 
Giunta (2000, p39), really takes this any further and suggests that the new competitive 
environment has led to the adoption of a new approach to manufacturing and 
procurement. The approach takes the form of what has come to be known generically 
as lean production.  
 
The lean production model as outlined in the seminal work of Womack et al. (1990) 
describes the manufacturing and procurement techniques introduced into the 
automotive industry by the Japanese. Lean production represents a new mode of 
production (Saunders, 1997, p16) capable of transforming manufacturing activities in 
the same way that mass production did in the early years of the 20th century. Lean 
production is associated with the elimination of  all forms of waste including 
superfluous procedures (Lamming, 1996, p196) from all stages of the production 
process ranging from the procurement of raw materials through to the end consumer 
(Lamming, 1996: p184). From the outset the role of the supply chain has been an 
important element in the lean production model. One of the first accounts of lean 
production (Krafcik, 1988: p43) noted that supply chain arrangements were different, 
in particular that vertical integration was largely absent and that instead external 
suppliers were closely integrated into assembly operations. Similarly Kay (1993) 
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comments that relationships with suppliers can be a an important aspect of an 
organisation’s ‘distinctive capability’. 
 
The importance of the supply chain within lean production has led to the emergence 
of lean supply, that is, the establishment of arrangements within the supply chain 
designed to aid and facilitate lean production methods. In lean supply, ‘the entire flow 
from raw materials to consumer’ is considered as an integrated whole (Lamming, 
1996: p187) and managed so as to minimize waste in all its forms. According to 
Lamming the fundamental principle of lean supply is that, ‘the effects of costs 
associated with less than perfect execution of a sub-process are not limited to the 
location of the execution’.  
 
For firms previously wedded to vertical integration, lean supply is a significant 
change. Even for firms, such as aerospace prime contractors, who have in the past 
made extensive use of sub-contracting, lean supply means strategic changes in terms 
of relations with the subcontractors who make up their supply chain. Whereas in the 
past subcontracting may have been a means of overcoming capacity constraints 
(Freeman, 1991: p505, Sako, 1994, p269), lean supply involves closer relationships 
between prime contractors and their suppliers with much effort directed at the 
management of such relationships. Unlike supply chain management neither party in 
such relationships is dominant, one of the differentiating principles of lean supply is 
that both parties recognize the ‘mutual destiny’ of their neighbours in the supply chain 
(Lamming, 1996: p187). 
 
In his work on lean supply, Lamming highlights the changing role of suppliers. Under 
lean supply, suppliers need to possess a range of capabilities and behave in a way that 
makes them more than mere subcontractors. First tier suppliers especially, who are 
close to the final industrial customer, take on a strategic role. These strategic suppliers 
Lamming (1993: p180) describes as ‘talented’ suppliers.  
 
What makes some suppliers within the supply chain strategic suppliers and thereby 
merit the title of talented suppliers?  Lamming suggests that these strategic suppliers 
are differentiated by a number of characteristics. These can be grouped under three 
main headings. Firstly they are larger suppliers, with an increased range of enhanced 
capabilities. Consequently they can offer a broader range of services. Their greater 
capability means they are also able to play a bigger developmental role within the 
industry.  
 
Secondly strategic suppliers can be differentiated by their place in the supply chain. 
As prime contractors, in pursuit of lower costs, increasingly prefer to purchase fully-
assembled sub-systems or modules, so they increasingly delegate part of the 
integration task to their suppliers. Thus strategic suppliers integrate diverse 
technologies into the sub-system for which they are responsible. This responsibility 
combined with their position as a direct supplier to prime contractors  serves to 
differentiate them from other suppliers from lower tiers who merely supply 
components or sub-contract services. In practice this is also likely to mean that 
strategic suppliers have responsibility for coordinating and managing their own 
suppliers and sub-contractors from lower tiers of the supply chain (Lamming, 1993: 
p189). The extent to which strategic suppliers are differentiated in this way is closely 
linked to the development of systems within the final product. It is the development of 
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systems that facilitates this form of tiering. With responsibility not just for 
manufacture, but design and development as well, strategic suppliers effectively 
become systems integrators for the system or module for which they are responsible.  
 
The third feature of strategic suppliers is the presence of a strong vertical relationship  
with their customers. What makes the relationship strong? It is a long term 
relationship (Syson, 1989, p17; Lamming, 1996, p196) rather than one based on short 
term ‘dog eat dog’ relations (Lamming, 1996, p185) that are associated with 
competitive bidding. The long term nature of the relationship is reflected in the use of 
formal long term agreements (Giunta, 2000, p40) between customer and supplier. 
Another feature of the relationship is that it is based on collaborative effort rather than 
competition. Collaboration typically involves the sharing of information in contrast to 
the adversarial approach that characterizes traditional procurement arrangements. 
Strong vertical relationships are also according to Lamming (1993, p178) ones 
between equals, that do not recognize the traditional stance of suppliers in relation to 
customers. Equality stems from the recognition by customers and suppliers that they 
are in ‘the same boat’, with their mutual destinies closely linked (Lamming,1996, 
p187). This is a far cry from the traditional ‘arm’s length’ purely contractual 
relationship (Syson, 1992: p93) typical of procurement regimes in many industries, 
even in the 1990s, including aerospace (Gray, Golob and Markusen, 1996: p657). 
 
While lean supply is clearly concerned with the elimination of activities that are 
wasteful and inefficient it also has implications for innovation. Lamming, (1993, 
p195) suggests that lean supply is not just about the elimination of waste in order to 
lower costs and improve efficiency. Lamming (1993) suggests that a move towards 
lean supply may have implications as far as innovation is concerned. The context of 
Lamming’s consideration of lean supply is the automotive industry and he observes 
that in this industry the standardisation and vertical integration associated with mass 
production may well have discouraged innovation especially where suppliers are 
concerned. Moves towards lean supply he suggests may provide scope for changing 
the dynamics of innovation as vertical disintegration releases the innovative capability 
of suppliers. Other researchers (Saunders, 1997; Sako, 1994) have lent support to this 
view. Sako (1994: p270) for instance suggests that suppliers are more likely to 
innovate if they think they will get a share of the benefits.  
 
This perspective contrasts sharply with the much more pessimistic perspective of  
Bruce and Moger (1999). Bruce and Moger (1999) suggest that initiatives like lean 
supply and supply chain management may actually have the opposite effect. The 
substance of their case is that close relationships between supplier and customer may 
limit a supplier’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) so that it fails to 
absorb and utilize the external stimuli that should lead to innovation. They suggest 
(Bruce and Moger, 1999: p122) that under lean supply firms may be, ‘concentrating 
so hard on their joint realities’ that they miss or fail to appreciate technological 
opportunities that emerge in the marketplace.  
 
Against this background the adoption of lean supply is likely to have important 
consequences for a high technology industry such as aerospace. Indeed the 
implications of lean supply for innovation are a source of particular interest. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Since the aerospace industry has not been the subject of a great deal of scholarly 
attention, the study reported here should be seen as indicative and exploratory. The 
aim is to identify the changes taking place and to try to make sense of them. The 
research approach was qualitative and as such designed to illuminate the issues 
(Gillham, 2000) surrounding strategic change in the UK aerospace industry and 
provide insights into the processes at work. 
The investigation comprised two parts. The first part explored the character of the 
changes taking place in the UK aerospace industry. This was undertaken through the 
analysis of specialist literature and interviews with ‘key informants’. The specialist 
literature comprises a variety of weekly and monthly magazines on the industry, 
together with a small number of annual industry reviews published by trade 
associations and books about the industry. These publications provide extensive 
background detail. The annual reports of aerospace manufacturers at different levels 
of the supply chain were also reviewed. In addition, key informant interviews were 
undertaken with three individuals, each of whom had close links to the aerospace 
industry.  
 
The second part of the study involved in-depth interviews with executives and 
managers working for companies from across the aerospace industry supply chain. A 
total of ten semi-structured interviews were undertaken. The interviewees included 
four managing directors and one company chairman. One interviewee was a 
consultant who worked exclusively for aerospace organizations. The remaining 
interviewees were functional managers. Although the number of interviews was 
small, the fact that sample included a large proportion of senior managers able to 
comment in detail on industry trends was felt to be significant. Each interview lasted 
1-2 hours and was taped. The tapes were subsequently transcribed with outstanding 
points then clarified with respondents over the telephone. Field notes were also made. 
A ‘purposive’ sampling approach (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003) was used in 
selecting the sample, in order to include interviewees well placed to comment on 
changes taking place within the UK aerospace industry. The sample included 
individuals from some of the major players in the industry but also covered 
companies from other levels of the aerospace supply chain. The data was analysed 
manually, which was manageable given the small number of interviews. Data 
reduction, designed to sharpen and focus the data, was undertaken by coding the 
transcripts and field notes. Coding facilitated sorting into clusters based on emerging 
themes, such as partnership relationships. In addition a small number of ‘vignettes’ 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: p51) were identified that succinctly and graphically 
illustrated the changes taking place in the industry.  
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THE UK AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
 
Though dwarfed by its American counterpart, the UK aerospace industry is the 
second largest in the Western world and the largest in Europe. In 2000 it achieved a 
turnover of £18.49 billion (SBAC, 2002) and employed 147,090 employees. These 
figures mark its importance to the UK economy. Aerospace contributed 2.2 per cent 
of the UK’s Gross Domestic Product (Francillon, 1998). At the same time 63 per cent 
of the industry’s output was exported. Contributing £2.8 billion to the UK Balance of 
Trade. The UK aerospace industry’s return on capital was higher than either the 
European or American average. The industry has generally adapted well to the new 
environment. It is now much less dependent on the state. Whereas the military/civil 
split of sales was 70:30 in 1980 by the mid-1990s the split was 54:46 (House of 
Commons, 1993). 
 
 
In terms of structure, the aerospace industry comprises three sectors: airframes and 
systems, engines and equipment. Some idea of the relative importance of each sector 
can be gauged from the numbers employed. Not unsurprisingly airframes and systems   
is the biggest sector employing 42% of the industry workforce. It is made up of a 
small number of large prime contractors like BAE Systems that  manufacture aircraft, 
helicopters, missiles and satellites. As prime contractors they are systems integrators 
who design, develop, manufacture and support the final product. As systems 
integrators they possess the full range of capabilities and have ultimate control of the 
product. The engine sector is much smaller with 24 per cent of industry employment. 
It is dominated by a single prime contractor, the engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce. 
 
 
The equipment sector forms the bulk of the supply chain. It comprises firms making a 
‘plethora of parts and components which go into finished aircraft’ (Todd and 
Simpson, 1986: p111). In terms of products it includes aircraft instruments, avionics, 
communications equipment, computer systems, gears and transmissions, landing gear 
and navigation systems. As part of the supply chain, equipment manufacturers supply  
the prime contractors. The supply chain is pyramidal in structure, with a small number 
of large prime contractors supplied by a ‘comet’s tail’ (Hayward, 1994: p6) 
comprising a large number of generally small equipment suppliers. The equipment 
sector accounts for 34 per cent of those employed in the UK aerospace industry. 
However this figure is deceptive and understates the scale of the aerospace industry 
supply chain. It includes a handful of larger suppliers like Smiths, Cobham and 
Meggitt which though smaller  than prime contractors like BAE Systems, nonetheless 
are large enough to be  classified among the world’s 100 largest aerospace companies. 
However many suppliers are not included in the industry’s total employment. They 
supply other industries such as the automotive industry and are not classified as 
aerospace companies. Moore et al. (2001: p39) estimate that small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) constitute, ‘the bulk of the industry in terms of revenue and 
employment’. 
 
It is the large number of small equipment suppliers that helps to give the industry its 
distinctive pyramid structure. At the top of the pyramid are the prime contractors, 
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who, as systems integrators  have overall responsibility for programmes and a full 
range of design, development and manufacturing capabilities. Underneath are a very 
large number of suppliers. Many are small enterprises supplying specialized 
components and services. Moore et al. (2001) note that information has traditionally 
flowed down from the systems integrators to suppliers who have acted as sub-
contractors, a relationship usually described as arm’s length contracting. 
 
 
STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE UK AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
 
Aerospace is widely recognized as a high technology industry. By its very nature is a 
high precision, high quality, high performance industry whose products Hobday 
(1998: p689) classifies as complex products and systems (CoPS). Manufacturing is 
carried out on the basis of small batch production methods. It is more akin to 
motorsport as an industry than the automotive industry. Consequently as one recent 
study (Hislop, 1997) put it, as late as the early 1990s the UK aerospace industry was 
dominated in managerial terms by projects controlled by engineering functions, with 
the technical aspects of projects being given precedence over other issues, especially 
commercial ones. As far as the supply chain was concerned, the dominant relationship 
was one in which, as one of the respondents in our study described it, ‘the 
subcontractor cuts metal’. Another respondent summarized the situation when he 
observed that, ‘aerospace is a very staid industry’.  
 
However evidence from both documentary sources and the interviews conducted as 
part of the study clearly points to what can only be described as strategic changes 
sweeping through the aerospace industry in recent years. One key informant reflected 
that, ‘the game is definitely changing’. The managing director of one medium-sized 
aerospace subcontractor talked of, ‘an industry in turmoil’ while the managing 
director of a much larger aerospace supplier described his organization as, ‘bracing 
itself for further upheaval’. In fact all the respondents talked about strategic changes 
underway within the industry. 
 
What kinds of change?  There were frequent references to re-structuring by means of 
company acquisitions and disposals. One of the key informants described how a large 
first tier supplier had been ‘acquiring heavily in the US’, while another described 
recent changes in the industry as, ‘all about integrating and bringing businesses 
together’. In fact every one of the companies from whom respondents were drawn had 
been involved in acquisitions or disposals within the last five years. In two instances 
venture capitalist organizations had been behind the re-structuring, buying subsidiary 
companies from large organizations and then merging them with other companies. 
These acquisitions were not, as one respondent put it, ‘acquisitions for the sake of 
bulk’, they were targeted acquisitions designed to add to the range of expertise that 
the acquiring organization was able to offer as an aerospace supplier.  
 
Nor was the re-structuring confined to acquisitions. One respondent, the managing 
director of a first tier supplier, noted how his organization had acquired several 
companies in the last 10 years. In each instance the company’s intention was to, ‘buy 
it for a specific purpose’. However where the business contained peripheral activities 
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that did not fit the company’s strategy, the company would, ‘package them up and sell 
them to the highest bidder’. 
 
Another strategic change highlighted by a large proportion of respondents was a trend 
towards vertical disintegration and increased use of outsourcing. One respondent, the 
chairman of a first tier supplier, suggested that within the aerospace industry, 
outsourcing was not new. Many prime contractors were originally highly vertically 
integrated not out of choice but because the highly specialized nature of much of the 
materials and processes they employed, meant that there simply was no one else to 
manufacture the very large number of parts and components they required. 
Outsourcing, he suggested, often began with prime contractors seeking additional 
capacity to cope with the highly cyclical nature of the aerospace industry. As the 
subcontractor accumulated expertise, outsourcing became permanent. He added that 
more recently prime contractors had taken renewed interest in outsourcing,  
 
‘they are looking at what they do and coming to the conclusion that their 
business is not making parts their business is technology and designing and 
selling engines. If parts can be obtained from specialists, why spend large 
amounts of money owning factories and the people who sit in those factories.’ 
 
However several respondents indicated that the trend towards increased use of 
outsourcing had been gathering momentum during the 1990s. One respondent detailed 
what happened to the aerospace supplier he was working for in the early1990s, 
 
‘We had a strategic outsourcing initiative from 1992 onwards. We used to 
fabricate most parts ourselves. We had a huge outsourcing initiative 
predominantly driven by lack of finance to develop new programmes. A lot of 
our employees went to local suppliers, machine shops and tooling 
manufacturing companies. Where we performed these services ourselves we 
outsourced them and people who were laid off or wanted to leave the 
company, went to work for these smaller organizations.’ 
 
This vignette (Miles and Huberman, 1994: p81) was not an isolated case. Another 
responded recounted how, 
 
‘the joke in the industry was that the builders, British Aerospace, Shorts and 
Boeing had an ambition, which was to buy an aircraft in two halves, to add 
the last two bolts, to bolt it together, to spray it and roll it out.’ 
 
Hence as the product has become more complex with more technologies being 
employed, prime contractors have become increasingly concerned to focus on their 
core activities, making outsourcing an increasingly attractive option. Alongside this 
broad trend towards outsourcing and vertical disintegration one can also discern a 
trend towards the outsourcing of specific functions. One respondent for instance 
described how in the late 1980s his organization, as a subcontractor had, ‘all of the 
quality assurance process including the final check’ handed down to it by the prime 
contractor. Nor was this the end of the story. The same respondent went on to note,  
 
 12
Po
t-Pri
‘so by the beginning of the 1990s we were in supplier mode. We ran our own 
quality assurance completely, including the final signing off. We finished, we 
treated components and we delivered systems.’ 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF SUPPLIERS 
 
As well as these broad industry-wide trends that have had a wide-ranging impact on 
the  aerospace supply chain, the interviews with practitioners carried out as part of the 
study unearthed more specific changes that point to the same suppliers increasingly 
taking on a new role, that owes less to the traditional subcontractor role associated 
with suppliers in the aerospace supply chain and instead closely follows that described 
by Lamming (1993) in putting forward the notion of ‘talented suppliers’, which he 
argues is a feature of lean supply.  
 
Larger and more capable suppliers 
A movement towards larger suppliers appeared to be associated with prime 
contractors rationalizing their supplier base. Three quarters of respondents, identified 
a clearly discernible trend towards rationalization the size of the supply base, so that 
prime contractors interface directly with fewer suppliers. Whereas in the past prime 
contractors procured components from thousands of suppliers, increasingly in both 
the airframe and engine sectors, they now deal directly with far fewer. Hislop (1997) 
refers to British Aerospace in the mid-1990s reducing the size of its supply base from 
11,000 to 4,000 firms. However most respondents pointed to rather more dramatic 
reductions. As one respondent explained,  
 
‘…prime contractors like Rolls, their strategy has been to reduce their upplier 
base from five hundred to fifty key suppliers.’  
 
The logic behind the change is simplifying practice and increasing efficiency. Hislop 
(1997: p6) notes that prime contractors in the past maintained ‘large administration, 
quality and contract departments, in order to …control the large amount of 
subcontract work.’ Thus working with fewer suppliers, especially where they are 
designated preferred suppliers,  reduces the need for this sort of administrative work 
and the departments and staff associated with it.  
 
As the number of suppliers is reduced, so those that remain get bigger and extend 
their capabilities. For instance, one respondent described how the organization for 
which he worked, had only recently been formed, by merging three formerly separate 
companies. He explained how, 
 
“XYZ is a relatively new company formed about 18 months ago. It was 
formerly three separate companies X at Oldbury, Y at Birmingham and Z at 
Redditch. These were all medium-sized engineering companies, which 
supplied the aerospace industry.” 
 
The same respondent went on to stress, 
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“More and more we’re expected to work closely with our customers. The 
bigger suppliers they’ve got the resources to support this sort of thing. Size is 
important.”   
 
Another respondent noted the part played by venture capitalists in creating larger and 
more capable suppliers, 
 
“The more enterprising venture capitalist will look not just to buy a four 
hundred million pound company, but will be looking for that company to be a 
vehicle for strapping on things that the company itself couldn’t afford. So with 
venture capitalist money companies can make acquisitions that will build the 
supplier and double its size.” 
 
The logic behind suppliers being bigger is that they are more capable and able to offer 
a broader range of services. Extending the range of services that a supplier could offer 
to prime contractors was an aim for all the subcontractors interviewed. One explained 
his company’s policy in terms of,  
 
“the aim was to provide a unique service where you would go from billet to 
forging to machining to surface treatment. It was a case of consolidation but 
very much with the idea of providing a one-stop-shop service.”  
 
The impact of increasing the range of services offered, in terms of the role of the 
supplier, was illustrated by another respondent, 
 
“So the role of the subcontractor, and we were one, was to move progressively 
towards being a tier one supplier rather than just a subcontract metal cutter. 
In our case we decided that we would extend our metal cutting by adding a 
composite material manufacturing capability.” 
 
Nor was this an enhancement of an organisation’s capabilities simply a matter of 
being able to provide a broader range of services. The earlier reference to a firm being 
able to offer a ‘one-stop-shop’ type of service indicates that suppliers were now 
offering a different kind of service to their customers. Similarly some respondents 
talked of extending their product range. One respondent described how his 
organization had extended its product portfolio, 
 
“We saw that there was a big business opportunity coming in industrial 
turbines and not only was that for airfoils but it was for a different process. 
Instead of forging it was a casting process, investment casting, and X had very 
little casting capability. So the acquisition of Y was made which automatically 
gave us investment casting facilities to support the industrial turbine business.  
 
Hence what emerges is a picture of suppliers both large and small extending their 
capabilities. For the smaller suppliers this amounts to offering more services while for 
the larger suppliers it is also about extending the range of products they supply. 
 
Differentiated into tiers 
Tiers are not new to the aerospace industry since it has long been recognized that the 
industry is pyramid-shaped, with prime contractors on top of a large number of 
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suppliers who are essentially subcontractors. This structure remains under lean supply 
but the function of suppliers changes. Instead of just being subcontractors, some 
suppliers at least are differentiated as they increasingly take responsibility for 
complete sub-systems integrating several components into a sub-system that they then 
supply to the prime contractor (Lamming, 1996). In the process these first tier 
suppliers effectively become systems integrators themselves co-ordinating and 
managing their own supplier base. Components produced by firms within this supply 
base are routed through first tier suppliers (Lamming, 1996: p190). Hence tiers of the 
supply pyramid are increasingly differentiated. These suppliers, usually designated 
preferred suppliers, that remain as first tier suppliers take on a more extensive range 
of functions to enable them to deal direct with prime contractors, while the remainder 
supply components.  
 
Several respondents talked about their organization now assuming responsibility for 
complete sub-systems. A respondent from one of the larger suppliers offered a 
vignette that showed this process at work, 
 
“A. recently bought a company called B. They subsequently bought a company 
in Lincoln called C., that’s part of a very clear strategy to move into modular 
supply, in that C. and B. are two of the three companies in the world that can 
make compressor turbine discs and to a certain extent shafts. We can see the 
idea that they are going down the road of being able, at some stage, to supply 
a complete rotating assembly.” 
 
Nor was this confined to relatively large items. Another respondent from a company 
that had been a pure subcontractor producing small components explained how they 
too had been encouraged to engage in modular supply, 
 
“Suppliers were encouraged to take a more integrated approach so that 
components were cut and then finished and treated by the supplier. Sub-
assemblies were carried out, things like bearings were fitted, units were put 
together and complete sub-assemblies of a working nature were then sold to 
the customer.” 
 
Previously only prime contractors managed and coordinated suppliers. However one 
of the expert witnesses noted that ‘prime contractors like R. want first tier suppliers to 
manage other suppliers for them’, and this was borne out in the interviews with 
practitioners. Several of the respondents who were employed by suppliers indicated 
that coordinating their own suppliers was a task that they were taking on if they 
wanted to be so-called direct suppliers servicing prime contractors. One respondent 
explained how this change was affecting his organization which had previously been 
just a subcontractor, 
 
“…firms like M. are increasingly moving towards an integrator role, sourcing 
at least some of their output from outside, mainly low technology output that 
can be outsourced to paces like Asia. Instead M. can then concentrate on high 
technology outputs. This means that at M. we now manage somebody else 
doing something. We’re doing an exercise now to seek outside people who can 
do work for us.” 
  
 15
P
st-Pri t
The benefits of this type of arrangement, as far as  prime contractors are concerned, 
were explained by a respondent from one of the larger suppliers when he explained 
that, 
 
“This releases the aircraft constructor of the task of having to coordinate a 
large number of suppliers who contribute to the system at that level.” 
 
 
New style co-partnership relationships 
The third aspect of lean supply is a move away from purely contractual relations in 
favour of greater emphasis on collaboration and partnership (Lamming, 1996, p184). 
Hislop (1997: p6) mentions changes in supplier relations as a feature of the aerospace 
industry in the 1990s and the same point was made by two of the key informants, one 
of whom described, ‘new style supply arrangements’ being adopted. Respondents 
from the industry were more specific. One respondent, who worked for a 
subcontractor, commented, ‘our major customer has changed the way they deal with 
us’, while another described, ‘a move away from build-to-print’. 
 
Build-to-print describes the traditional arrangement between contractor and 
subcontractor where the subcontractor performs processing operations to a 
specification laid down  by the subcontractor. As one respondent put it, ‘it was …a 
case of taking a tape or program direct from the builder and just putting it in the 
machines’. Sometimes described as ‘arm’s length contracting’ (Syson, 1992: p93), it 
requires nothing more than processing from the subcontractor. The five respondents 
who worked for subcontractors all described how their organizations were 
increasingly expected to do more than carry out processing operations. Typically the 
new arrangements involved the subcontractor ‘using its expertise and experience to 
initiate improvements’ in terms of manufacturing operations. A respondent working 
for a subcontractor described his organisation’s input to these new working 
arrangements, 
 
‘There is a new design…and a lot of the drawings we get through are not final 
release, so there is a degree of working between ourselves and the design team 
to actually look at the engineering . We’ve certainly got involved in looking at 
actual products, approving them from the machining point of view.’  
 
This closer collaboration was described by one key informant as, ‘more use of 
partnerships and alliances than there was in the past’, while a respondent employed by 
a prime contractor stated, ‘there is increasing emphasis on working together with 
organizations up and down the supply chain’. This was echoed by a supplier who 
noted, ‘They (the primes) are encouraging the supply chain to re-group and make 
itself more a partner than a contributor’. 
 
Of course partnership can take very different forms. Lamming (1993, p180) talks 
about ‘stronger vertical relationships’ and ‘ very close ties’. One manifestation of a 
move away from conventional contracting in favour of partnership is the increased 
use of long term agreements. These are supply agreements of five or even ten years 
duration. The basic idea behind long term agreements as one practitioner explained is,  
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‘to allow the tier one supplier to schedule production for some time ahead in 
order to manage procurement  and in turn have an organised and disciplined 
supply chain’. 
 
Sometimes these agreements involve an increased level of business (coming from 
firms that do not sign up to such agreements) in return for price reductions. 
 
However while several respondents referred to such agreements, many seemed to 
think that they represented an unequal form of partnership. Comments ranged from, 
 
‘Long term agreements are a joke. They are a response to a changing 
relationship in terms of the buyer/seller balance of power.’ 
 
and, 
  
‘they are adversarial, they like to talk about partnering and this, but there is a 
very strong us and them as far as customer supplier relationships.’ 
 
to, 
 
‘the term partnership is a little bit of a loose term. It is certainly not an equal 
partnership. There is some form of partnership but it is very much dominated 
by the customer at the end of the day.’ 
 
Hence while clearly relationships between customers and suppliers are changing and 
there is increasingly a two way flow of advice and guidance, equality of partnership 
as espoused by Lamming has not occurred.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION 
 
What are the implications for innovation? Does the evidence point to Lamming’ s 
more optimistic view that under lean supply as one moves away from standardization 
and vertical integration there will be more scope for suppliers to innovate or does it 
point to Bruce and Moger’ s more pessimistic view that the pressure to manage the 
supply chain efficiently will leave no time or scope for innovation? Given these 
opposing views, the implications for innovation of the strategic changes in the 
aerospace supply chain , especially whether suppliers are more or less active in 
relation to innovation, is a feature lean supply that provokes considerable interest. 
Initially the evidence favoured Bruce and Moger’s perspective. Several respondents, 
when asked about the extent to which they were involved in innovation, stated 
categorically that their organization did not engage in innovation. They cited the lack 
of new projects in the civil aerospace field as the reason for this. Interestingly the 
same respondents at a later stage then proceeded to describe how their organizations 
had been active in introducing significant manufacturing process innovations.  
 
Two examples stand out. Both were from suppliers who in the past might have been 
described as ‘subcontract metal cutters’. The first was a new process for 
manufacturing large turbine blades or airfoils that form part of the compressor on a 
commercial jet engine. Given the demanding conditions under which they operate, the 
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larger airfoils have traditionally been manufactured using forgings. However forging 
is a relatively slow process requiring highly skilled labour, that another respondent 
noted was often in short supply. The respondent described how his organisation had 
developed a technique for making large airfoils using the single crystal casting 
process (Prencipe, 1997: p1271) used for manufacturing small airfoils whereby a 
single grain is allowed to grow into the main body of the casting so as to avoid the 
boundaries between grains of metal that so often cause fatigue. This was no copycat 
innovation. Cooling is a key feature of the process for casting small airfoils. The 
increased amount of metal involved in casting large airfoils gives rising to further 
cooling problems. The company had, through much R & D effort, developed a novel 
solution. As a result not only was it now possible to cast large airfoils instead of 
forging them, but it was possible to cast eight large airfoils at a time. Though not yet 
in production, the technique had enormous commercial potential. Hence the process 
was described as,  
 
‘a real ‘A’ rated technical process that no one else can copy and also  one that 
is very commercially attractive, because you get a very big, high technology 
airfoil, but quickly.’ 
 
In a similar manner, another respondent, this time from a smaller supplier, described a 
process innovation his organization had undertaken. The company was involved in 
precision machining of components and the respondent described how, 
 
‘a lot of them [components] were made out of forgings and castings and as 
machining technologies improved there was the opportunity to manufacture 
from bar instead of forgings which is obviously cheaper and quicker. That 
again has probably been the biggest innovation we’ve done.’ 
 
These two cases show suppliers working more closely with their customers than 
would be the case with traditional build-to-print arrangements. However the cases 
also make clear that the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) of each 
company was undiminished. Both companies were well aware of wider, external 
developments in their respective technologies and had the internal capacity both to 
assimilate such developments and make use of them in successfully pursuing process 
innovations. The companies may not have been active in product innovations, but the 
evidence presented here shows that both were active in terms of process innovations. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Earlier studies have pointed to significant changes within the aerospace industry in 
response to the new environment that emerged in the 1990s. A number of studies had 
extended this analysis to show the changes filtering down the supply chain both in the 
US and Europe. This study has plugged a gap by analyzing developments in the 
European country with the largest aerospace industry, namely the UK. Like earlier 
studies this too points to extensive re-structuring of the supply chain. 
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However most earlier studies have been confined to analyzing the impact of changes 
in the aerospace environment. Only Giunta (2000) pointed to lean ideas as a powerful 
influence on the changes taking place and she reported only limited evidence of its 
influence within the aerospace supply chain in the Campania region of Southern Italy.  
 
In contrast this study indicates that in the UK aerospace industry supply chain re-
structuring has been and continues to be extensive and there is strong evidence from 
across the supply chain of the influence of lean ideas. In particular the study points to 
major changes in the role of suppliers very much along the lines indicated by 
Lamming, who suggests that lean ideas should lead to significant changes in the role 
of suppliers  hence his ‘talented’ suppliers. The only aspect of Lamming’s talented 
suppliers not in evidence in the UK aerospace industry was the notion of their being 
on equal terms with their customers. Rather the study points to the balance of power 
remaining firmly with customers.  
 
While it is tempting to suggest that aerospace is simply copying ideas from the 
automotive industry, closer examination of the industry context suggests the changes 
in the aerospace supply chain do not represent mimetic change as ideas and practices 
from the automotive sector percolate through to the aerospace industry. Such an 
analysis while quite plausible is much too simplistic. As the aerospace industry 
matures it is increasingly important for the prime contractors to utilize developments 
across a range of technologies. Under these circumstances systems integration 
becomes vitally important. Consequently the changes in the supply chain are largely 
organisational precisely because they are designed to make systems integration easier 
and more effective. This study has gone some way to identify and understand these 
organisational changes. However if we are to fully understand and account for these 
organisational changes in general and the emergence of strategic suppliers in 
particular, further detailed work is required following up these earlier findings.     
  
In terms of innovation, Bruce and Moger’s pessimistic predictions do not appear to be 
borne out. Nor for that matter was Lamming’s optimistic scenario involving changes 
in the dynamics of innovation much in evidence, probably because his analysis was 
based on the automotive industry. Since standardization and mass production have 
never been a feature of aerospace, lean supply was never likely to lead to new 
innovation dynamics in this industry. However the study does show that talented 
suppliers are likely to be active in innovation, though in aerospace it appears more 
likely that this will be process, rather than product innovation, reflecting increased 
capability and competence.
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